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Abstract
Background: Fast changes in human demographics worldwide, coupled with increased mobility, and modified land uses
make the threat of emerging infectious diseases increasingly important. Currently there is worldwide alert for H5N1 avian
influenza becoming as transmissible in humans as seasonal influenza, and potentially causing a pandemic of unprecedented
proportions. Here we show how epidemiological surveillance data for emerging infectious diseases can be interpreted in
real time to assess changes in transmissibility with quantified uncertainty, and to perform running time predictions of new
cases and guide logistics allocations.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We develop an extension of standard epidemiological models, appropriate for emerging
infectious diseases, that describes the probabilistic progression of case numbers due to the concurrent effects of (incipient)
human transmission and multiple introductions from a reservoir. The model is cast in terms of surveillance observables and
immediately suggests a simple graphical estimation procedure for the effective reproductive number R (mean number of
cases generated by an infectious individual) of standard epidemics. For emerging infectious diseases, which typically show
large relative case number fluctuations over time, we develop a Bayesian scheme for real time estimation of the probability
distribution of the effective reproduction number and show how to use such inferences to formulate significance tests on
future epidemiological observations.
Conclusions/Significance: Violations of these significance tests define statistical anomalies that may signal changes in the
epidemiology of emerging diseases and should trigger further field investigation. We apply the methodology to case data
from World Health Organization reports to place bounds on the current transmissibility of H5N1 influenza in humans and
establish a statistical basis for monitoring its evolution in real time.
Citation: Bettencourt LMA, Ribeiro RM (2008) Real Time Bayesian Estimation of the Epidemic Potential of Emerging Infectious Diseases. PLoS ONE 3(5): e2185.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002185
Editor: David Lusseau, University of Aberdeen, United Kingdom
Received December 11, 2007; Accepted March 20, 2008; Published May 14, 2008
Copyright:  2008 Bettencourt, Ribeiro. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: We gratefully acknowledge the support of the U.S. Department of Energy through the LANL/LDRD Program for this work.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: lmbett@lanl.gov
. These authors contributed equally to this work.
Introduction
A pandemic of H5N1 influenza in birds is presently unfolding,
with over 50 countries around the world affected, resulting in
hundreds of millionsofdead animalsthrough infection or culling [1–
3]. This emergency and the associated risk of a devastating new
human pandemic [4–6] stress the need for new approaches targeted
specifically at detecting and monitoring the evolution of emerging
infectious diseases [7–9]. Assessing the risk of emergence of a human
epidemic at the genetic level requires accounting for rare stochastic
events, associated with genetic mutation and recombination, over
vast pathogen and host populations [4,8,10]. This makes prediction
of pathogenic evolution at the molecular level typically still very
difficult. Consequently, the first indications of disease emergence are
usually observed as infected cases in human and animal populations.
Thus, for early assessments of the epidemic potential of a new
outbreak, it is essential to assign quantitative meaning to existing
epidemiological surveillance data in real time, with quantified
uncertainty, and to use this knowledge to enable primary prevention
strategies targeted at reducing chances of pathogenic evolution.
The quantity that measures the epidemic potential of a pathogen
is the basic reproduction number R0 [11,12]. R0 is defined as the
average number of new infections created by an infectious individual
in an entirely susceptible population. For established human
pathogens, leading to standard epidemics, R0.1, as is the case of
seasonal or pandemic influenza [13–19]. In practice, epidemiolog-
ical data typically permit only the estimation of the effective
reproduction number R, which may differ from R0 due to acquired
immunity and other factors. For an emerging infectious disease,
when transmission is only incipient [20] and the pathogen is
adapting to the population, it becomes crucial to monitor
quantitative changes of the effective reproduction number over
time. Thus, the detection and tracking of an emerging disease can be
formalizedintermsofmonitoringR,asitevolvesandapproachesthe
critical threshold RR1.This is likelythe current state of H5N1avian
influenza in humans, where complete absence of human to human
transmission would imply R=0, but likely R is very small, as a few
cases of possible human contagion suggest [21–23].
Notwithstanding a marked recent increase in systematic
surveillance by national and international organizations, and the
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(syndromics) [24], the epidemiological regime of incipient but
evolving transmission has received little attention in terms of
quantitative modelling [22,25–28]. The main difficulty is that data
in these circumstances tend to be very stochastic, involve small
case numbers and may be plagued by uncertainties and
inconsistent reporting. As an example, we contrast in Figure 1
the time series of confirmed new human cases of H5N1 avian
influenza in Vietnam, reported by the World Health Organization
(WHO), with weekly isolate numbers for seasonal H3N2 influenza
in the USA during 2004–2005 (see Methods for ‘‘Data Sources’’).
The ultimate objective of this paper is to propose a methodology to
extract quantitative inferences and generate epidemiological
outlook in real time from time series like that of Figure 1a.
Recently the problem of real time monitoring of (emerging)
communicable diseases has gained growing attention, with a few
new methods proposed to estimate R. One method proposes the
analysis of the distribution of the sizes of case clusters to provide
indications of changes in R. Specifically, increases in R(,1)
translate on average into larger case cluster sizes [21,27–29].
Another approach [30] relies on the inference of probable chains
of transmission among observed cases from knowledge of the
statistical distribution of the infectious period. From an ensemble
of such chains and their associate compounded probability, R can
be estimated. This method has recently been applied to ‘‘real
time’’ monitoring of SARS [31,32], via a Bayesian inference
scheme. The strength of this class of methods is that they allow
insights into heterogeneities in the population. This demands the
consideration of all pairs of possible transmissions, which may
become computationally intense as case numbers rise and can be
sensitive to under reporting, competing risk and to the details of
the distribution of infectious periods. Moreover those studies
considered the efficacy of control measures for a disease with an
initial R.1 and no new cases introduced during the epidemic,
whereas it is typical of emerging communicable diseases that
adaptation of the pathogen’s tropism to the host population is the
result of numerous such introductions [22].
Here we propose an alternative approach, which addresses the
issue of new introductions, requires in general smaller computa-
tional overhead and results in the estimation of the full probability
distribution for R. The method is based on the probabilistic
formulation of standard SIR disease transmission models analo-
gous to the time-series SIR (TSIR) approach [33], which simplifies
the need to reconstruct transmission chains by aggregating all
infectious and susceptible individuals into classes that are assumed
to mix homogeneously. A Bayesian procedure is then employed to
translate the time series of case numbers into a probability
distribution for epidemiological parameters. The method adopts
the standard assumptions made in epidemiological compartment
models with homogeneously mixing classes, and benefits from
their simpler computational structure allowing efficient estimation
with available sparse empirical data. The estimation method
developed here has been applied once before [34] to 1918
influenza pandemic death notifications time series for San
Francisco, with the purpose of comparing its performance with
other conventional methods for estimating R. Here we present its
full derivation, provide more details and examples, include
introductions from an animal reservoir and show how the method
can be used to provide statistical expectations for new case
predictions. We also show how case predictions with quantified
uncertainty do, in turn, define possible statistical anomalies for
future case numbers, which can be used to inform surveillance and
Figure 1. Time series of new cases for an emerging infectious disease vs. a standard epidemic. (a) Laboratory confirmed new human
H5N1 avian influenza cases, from WHO reports in Vietnam (from January 2004 to June 2006); (b) Number of isolates for seasonal H3N2 influenza in the
USA, over the 2004–2005 season. Note the 100-fold difference in case numbers (y-axis) between panel (a) and (b). For an emerging infectious disease
such as H5N1 influenza in humans, case numbers are small, very stochastic, and alternate short outbreaks with long quiet periods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002185.g001
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outbreak. As an example, we apply the method to human case
data of H5N1 influenza in Vietnam and Indonesia, to produce
bounds on its effective reproduction number, R, and establish a
basis for its continued monitoring in real time.
Materials and Methods
Data sources
Time series of H5N1 influenza cases in humans were assembled
from World Health Organization (WHO) reports of confirmed
cases (http://www.who.int/csr/don/en/), from January 2004 to
June 1, 2006 (see Supplementary Material S1, including Figure S1,
for more information). Data for H3N2 seasonal influenza was
obtained from the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) Surveillance
Weekly Reports in the United States (http://www.cdc.gov/flu/
weekly/fluactivity.htm).
Model development
New human cases of avian influenza may result from two
alternative processes: i) infection of humans from animal sources
[4], or ii) human to human transmission [23]. For a standard
epidemic, explicit consideration of multiple introductions is not
important as each case produces many secondary infections. For
emerging infectious diseases multiple introductions from a
reservoir [22,25] may constitute an important fraction of all
observed cases, and the progression of secondary cases must be
carefully assessed and monitored.
Our objective is to cast standard SIR-class models in a form that
directly relates to time series data of emerging infectious diseases
by i) accounting for cases from reservoir sources, ii) casting the
model variables in terms of observable quantities reported from
field surveillance, iii) formulating the model in a discrete
probabilistic form, and iv) quantifying uncertainty in the
estimation of epidemiological parameters and future cases, and
assimilate new data to reduce it.
Average case progression in the absence of multiple
introductions
We consider a standard epidemic susceptible-infected (SIR)
model
dS
dt
~{b
S
N
I
dI
dt
~b
S
N
I{cI, ð1Þ
where S(t) is the average number of susceptibles at time t, I(t) is the
average number of infectious, N is the size of the population, which
decreases due to disease-induced deaths (taken as a fraction a of
progressing infections), b is the contact rate, and c
21 is the
infectious period. After an average residence time c
21, infectious
individuals recover or die (not shown in [1]). The total number of
cases up to time t, T(t) obeys the equation dT/dt=b S/NI .
Epidemic reports most commonly state the occurrence of new
infected cases, which over the period t, are given by
T(t+t)2T(t)=DT(t+t).
To find the expression accounting for the evolution of new cases
DT(t+t) we integrate Eq. [1], for I(t) between t and t+t, to obtain
It zt ðÞ ~It ðÞ exp c
ðtzt
t
R0
St 0 ðÞ
Nt 0 ðÞ
{1
  
dt0
  
&
It ðÞ exp tc Rt{1 ðÞ ½ 
ð2Þ
where R0=b/c, and Rt=(S(t)/N(t))6R0 (the ‘‘instantaneous’’
reproduction number) is a function of time; the last expression is
exact if S(t)/N(t) is constant in the period [t, t+t]. This simplifying
assumption is generally excellent for emerging infectious diseases,
which result in few cases within a much larger population.
Generally the validity of the assumption can be assessed through
consideration, from [1], of its evolution equation
d
dt
St ðÞ
Nt ðÞ
  
~{ c
It ðÞ
Nt ðÞ
R0{a ðÞ
  
St ðÞ
Nt ðÞ
ð3Þ
which shows that S(t)/N(t) is approximately constant over a time
interval t,i ftcI(t)/N(t)(R02a),,1. This condition is usually satisfied
as the fraction of infectious at a given time, I(t)/N(t), is typically less
than a few percent (even for seasonal influenza), while other quan-
tities in the product are of order unity. The quantity, in expression
[2], bR t ðÞ :exp c
Ð tzt
t Rt 0 ðÞ {1 ðÞ dt0   
&exp tcRt{1 ðÞ ½  evolves
I(t)t oI(t+t), accounting for the number of new cases resulting from
infections over time t [35].
To obtain the disease progression in terms of epidemiological
observables, we discretize the differential equation for the change
in total number of cases between t and t+t as
Tt zt ðÞ {Tt ðÞ
t
~b
St zt ðÞ
Nt zt ðÞ
It zt ðÞ &b
St ðÞ
Nt ðÞ
bR t ðÞ It ðÞ ð 4Þ
where we used [2] and the assumption that S(t)/N(t) is piecewise
constant over [t, t+t], but does vary between intervals contributing
to changes in Rt. At time t, the total number of cases is also
Tt ðÞ {Tt {t ðÞ
t
~b
St ðÞ
Nt ðÞ
It ðÞ ð 5Þ
Substituting expression [5] into [4], we obtain:
DTt zt ðÞ ~bR t ðÞ DTt ðÞ ð 6Þ
We see that the well known multiplicative progression between
new cases at successive times due to contagion appears, on average,
as a linear relation between DT(t+t)a n dDT(t) in an epidemic time
delay diagram, Figures 2a–d. Expression [6] generalizes similar
relations intheTSIR literature bycasting theminterms ofnewcases
over arbitrarily chosen observation intervals t, not necessarily
coinciding with the average generation time c
21. Expression [6] also
shows how the initial Rt can be estimated geometrically (without the
need for parameter search or numerical optimization) from an
epidemic time delay plot of surveillance data: b(Rt) is the slope of the
tangent at the origin of case trajectories (dashed line in Fig. 2a, b).
Foremerginginfectiousdiseasesrelativefluctuationsincasenumbers
are large, see e.g. Figure 2d, and this simple geometric approach is
not valid, thus making more robust estimation methods, as the one
presented here, necessary.
Progression of new cases due to human contagion and
multiple introductions
For emerging infectious diseases, many introductions from a
reservoir may occur before the pathogen adapts its tropism to the
new host population and produces epidemic outbreaks [22,25]. As
a result epidemiological models for the time evolution of new cases
must account for two processes: (incipient) human transmission
and infections from the reservoir.
We introduce a new source of infected individuals, through
contact with the reservoir (birds). The evolution of I is now given
Real Time Bayesian Estimation
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dI
dt
~ b
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Nt ðÞ
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It ðÞ zbbhSt ðÞ Kt ðÞ : ð7Þ
The first term on the right accounts for the human-to-human
infectious process. The last term is a source, creating new I
through contact with a reservoir of infectious agents of size K(t),
with contact rate bbh.
We denote the number of new infections from the reservoir per
unit time as dB/dt=bbh S(t) K(t). As a result the number of humans
infectious, I, and the total number of cases evolve as
dI
dt
~ b
St ðÞ
Nt ðÞ
{c
  
It ðÞ z
dB t ðÞ
dt
,
dT
dt
~b
St ðÞ
Nt ðÞ
It ðÞ z
dB t ðÞ
dt
: ð8Þ
The evolution of I(t) between t and t+t, accounting for the effects
of the inhomogeneous source term, is
It zt ðÞ ~bR t ðÞ
It ðÞ z
ðtzt
t
exp
ðt1
t
{c R0
St 2 ðÞ
Nt 2 ðÞ
{1
  
dt2
  
dB t1 ðÞ
dt1
dt1
  
,
:bR t ðÞ It ðÞ zY t,t,B ðÞ ½ 
ð9Þ
where Y(t, t ,B) denotes the integral. We use this expression to
solve for the number of new cases (Eq. [8]), giving
DTt zt ðÞ ~DBt zt ðÞ zbR t ðÞ DTt ðÞ {DBt ðÞ ztcRtY t,t,B ðÞ ½  :ð10Þ
Probabilistic models of contagion
A probabilistic description is crucial for realistic modelling of
new cases of emerging infectious diseases, which are typically
characterized by large coefficients of variation. This probabilistic
description is achieved, as in [33], by defining the number of new
cases, DT(t+t) as a stochastic discrete variable generated by a
Figure 2. Epidemic time delay diagrams for different R0. (a) Relation between new cases at consecutive time periods (weeks) for H3N2 isolates
in the US 2004–05 season, and for simulated data with (b) R0=1.7, (c) R0=1.0 and (d) R0=0.8. For these simulations, the introduction of new cases
from the reservoir follows the Vietnam case history, Figure 1a. New cases are then generated using expression [11], according to a Poisson
distribution. The trajectories connecting new cases at consecutive times (red arrows) eventually return to the origin because depletion of susceptibles
reduces the effective reproduction number (i.e. the actual number of secondary cases produced by an infectious individual). Dashed lines in (a) and
(b) are the tangents at the origin to the case number trajectories (red arrows), with slope b(R).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002185.g002
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[10], i.e.
DTt zt ðÞ *P DBt zt ðÞ zbR t ðÞ DTt ðÞ {DBt ðÞ ztcRtY t,t,B ðÞ ½  fg , ð11Þ
where P{l} denotes a discrete probability distribution with mean
l. If the only information on case evolution is their average
number then the maximum entropy distribution for P{} is Poisson,
which we adopt throughout this paper. If additional information
on the magnitude of fluctuations were also known, a generalized
distribution should be employed, such as a negative binomial [33],
which can account for clumping effects (we reproduce all
estimations from the main paper using a negative binomial in
Supplementary Material S1, Table S2).
To use expression [11] in practice, we need to evaluate the
integral Y. Assuming the introductions from the reservoir per unit
time to be approximately constant between t and t+t, the integral
can be calculated to first order as Y(t,t,B)=t dB/dt and, [11] is
written as
DTt zt ðÞ *P DBt zt ðÞ zbR t ðÞ DTt ðÞ {DBt ðÞ ztcRtDBt ðÞ ðÞ fg ð12Þ
where we replaced tdB/dt by its discrete approximation DB(t). This
is the expression used in practice in all quantitative estimations
presented.
Bayesian estimation of R with quantified uncertainty
Parameter estimation with quantified uncertainty can be
achieved using a Bayesian approach in the context of probabilistic
epidemiological models. Bayes’ theorem expresses the full
probability distribution for model parameters, such as the effective
reproduction number, R, in terms of the probabilistic epidemio-
logical model [12], given the time series for new cases. Specifically,
the probability distribution of R, compatible with the observed
temporal data stream is given by
PRDTt zt ðÞ /DTt ðÞ j ½  ~
P DTt zt ðÞ /DTt ðÞR j ½  PR ½ 
P DTt zt ðÞ /DTt ðÞ ½ 
: ð13Þ
P[R] is the prior, which captures given knowledge of the
distribution of R. The distribution P[DT(t+t)rDT(t)] is indepen-
dent of R, and corresponds to a trivial normalization. From
successive applications of Bayes’ theorem, a sequential estimation
scheme, that uses streaming epidemiological observations per-
formed in real time, can be constructed using the posterior
distribution for R, at time t as the prior in the next estimation step
at time t+t, leading to an update scheme via iteration of Eq. [13].
The resulting probability distribution for R includes information
on all observations up to time t, and contrasts with the
‘‘instantaneous’’ Rt, used above, which only considers the data at
times t and t+t. Thus, R is a robust estimator of the effective
reproduction number assumed to be constant for the whole
epidemic up to time t. Any changes in R over time result from the
assimilation of each new data point, leading to an updated
estimate of R. This in turn allows the use of our estimation
procedure as an anomaly detection tool (see below).
Time series of introductions and contagion
Ideally, field case tracing should provide a measure of the
likelihood that a new case resulted from contact with the (animal)
reservoir, DB in Eq. [12], or was due instead to human contagion.
Another possibility is to explicitly model the introductions from the
reservoir, K(t) in Eq. [7]. Although some empirical studies start to
address this possibility [27,36–38], it is still difficult to calibrate
such models and uncertainties remain large. Thus, for the
calculations in this study, we choose to use a minimal statistical
approach. Formally, assuming statistical independence between
different cases, we model each new introduction as a Bernoulli trial
with probability h. h is defined as the average probability that a
case is attributed to human to human contagion, and 1-h that it is
the result of an infection from the reservoir. Note that for
emerging infectious diseases this probabilistic model is more
appropriate and generalizes (see Supplementary Material S1,
Figure S2) the more typical modelling of introductions as
homogeneous Poisson processes [33].
We can provide an upper bound for h by considering observed
clusters of cases. If we take all confirmed cases in clusters, except
the index case, to be due to human contagion, then an estimate for
h is given by the proportion of such cases divided by the total
number observed over the same period. This gives an upper
bound on h, because it is unlikely that all cluster cases arise from
human infection, rather some could have a common reservoir
source. Two epidemiological studies of H5N1 influenza, one from
January 2004 to July 2005 [39] and another from July 2005 to
June 2006 [40], found that 26 of 109 cases and 15 of 54 cases,
respectively, occurred in family clusters Attributing those cases to
human infection gives h=0.24–0.28. This estimate of h is
consistent with an independent statistical analysis of a case cluster
in Indonesia, which found that the secondary attack rate for
household transmission of H5N1 influenza was 0.29 [28].
In the remaining of this paper we treat h as a constant
parameter common to all reported cases. The sensitivity of R
estimates is then assessed as a function of h (Table 1). In addition
to tests of the estimation procedure on epidemic data [34], we also
verified the precision of our methodology on an extensive number
of simulated case time series, based on a standard SIR model, with
introductions from a reservoir and different R0.
Numerical parameter estimation
We used the observed time series of new cases of human H5N1
influenza DT(t) to compute the probability distribution for R using
programs implemented both in Matlab and Fortran. We used an
unbiased uniform distribution for R between 0 and 3 as the initial
prior. For each subsequent weekly iteration, we computed the full
posterior distribution from [13] using the posterior at the previous
week as the new prior. The product of the two probabilities on the
right-hand side of [13] was evaluated as a non-parametric function
defined in terms of 1000 discrete bins in R between 0 and 3, as
shown in Figure S3 in the Supplementary Material S1. Parameters
choices used in the calculations in the main text are: t=1 week,
c=1 week
21, h variable as in Table 1. We also explored other
parameter choices reported in the literature for seasonal influenza
and corresponding results are given in Table S1 of Supplementary
Material S1.
Results
Simulated Outbreaks
Here we show how the method performs at estimating R from
single realization time series, produced by simulation with a
known value of R0. In all instances the time series for human
H5N1 cases in Vietnam (Figure 1a) was used as introductions into
the human population. For a choice of R0.1 in the simulation,
any introduction readily develops into an epidemic. For R0,1
each introduction leads to small outbreaks that eventually become
extinguished.
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method changes over time, because of decreases in the fraction
of susceptibles, S(t)/N(t), and the availability of more information,
as more cases are observed. Thus, we use the values obtained for R
at early times, when S(t)/N(t) approximates its initial value, to
estimate R0 of the simulation by assuming that max(R)=R0.A s
shown in Figure 3, in all circumstances, the method gives an
excellent estimation of R0 as outbreaks unfold, usually making
accurate predictions when supplied with a mere two or three
observation points. Uncertainty, measured by the width of the
95% credible interval, is reduced by larger case numbers, so that it
typically remains higher the smaller the R0. In all instances
uncertainty is reduced as more cases are reported over time.
Bounds on R for avian influenza in humans from WHO
reported time series
We next applied our method to the time series of cases of H5N1
influenza in humans. We produce estimates and credible bounds
for R, under different scenarios for the expected fraction of new
observed human cases that is attributable to human contagion h.
Summary results for Vietnam (and Indonesia) are given in Table 1.
Even in the worst case scenario, where all observed cases are
attributed to human transmission (h=1), the most likely (as of June
2006) R is 0.53 (0.56), with an upper 95% bound of R,0.77 (0.89).
For the estimated h=0.29 (see Methods), the most likely R for
both Vietnam and Indonesia is 0, although the estimated upper
95% bound in Vietnam gives the bound R,0.42. For Indonesia,
the corresponding estimate gives an R entirely consistent with zero
at the 95% credible level.
For less than 20% of the cases attributable to human
transmission, R is entirely consistent with zero, even when
accounting for the uncertainty in the duration of the infectious
period (c
21). Reported information does not allow at present a
precise determination of c
21 for H5N1 influenza in humans, so
that different scenarios are possible, which we explore in detail in
Supplementary Material S1 (Figure S4, Table S1). Data
permitting, a hierarchical Bayesian estimation method for the
distribution of c can also be envisaged [32].
Figure 4 shows the evolution of R and of its corresponding 95%
credible interval. The computation of successive probability
distributions for R gives a basis for assessing the evolution of
transmissibility over time, including the approach to the epidemic
threshold RR1. At present we conclude that, even in the
unrealistic worst case scenario, where cases are aggregated at the
national level and all cases are attributed to human transmission, R
remains below unity.
Shifts in transmissibility as statistical anomalies
The emergence of a new epidemic in humans often requires
shifts in pathogen biology and/or changes in the human
population structure. The methodology developed here can signal
these events as anomalies in the expected number of new cases.
Assuming no change of epidemiological conditions, knowledge of
the distribution of R, accumulated until time t, provides
expectations for future case numbers DT(t+t) , with quantified
credible intervals, via
P DTt zt ðÞ /DTt ðÞ ½  ~
ð
dR P DTt zt ðÞ /DTt ðÞR j ½  PR ½  ð 14Þ
where P[R] is taken as the posterior in [13] at time t, and
P[DT(t+t)rDT(t)|R] is the statistical epidemic model. Failure to
predict future observed cases at time t+t, can then be formulated
as a p-value significance test at any chosen level of credibility. A
statistical anomaly, i.e., future cases falling outside the credible
interval defined by previous observations, may signal changes in
epidemiological parameters, specifically in transmissibility (either
by pathogen evolution or host population changes) as measured by
R. We provide an example in Figure 5, for simulated data with
R0=0.8 changing to R0=1.3, where we show the predicted 95%
credible interval for new cases vs. the number of cases actually
observed (see also Figure S7 in Supplementary Material S1).
Discussion
Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases pose some of the
greatest health risks to human populations worldwide. Increasingly
they are a feature of our time, stoked by changes in human
demographics, mobility, land use and climate, and compounded
by poor standards of public health in parts of the world [26,41].
Importantly, new surveillance and intervention strategies are now
becoming possible, guided by quantitative interpretation of
epidemiological data, potentially strengthening the hand of
primary prevention efforts.
The modelling and prediction approaches developed here (see
also Chowell et al. [34] for a comparison to other methods)
provide tools for real time estimation of epidemiological
parameters that are appropriate for emerging infectious diseases.
The method is intentionally simple, relying on standard epidemi-
ological population models, in order to be commensurate with the
paucity of epidemiological data typically available for emerging
infectious diseases. These features are illustrated by the application
of the method to H5N1 influenza infection time series in humans.
Clearly, the SIR class of models, even when cast in probabilistic
Table 1. Bounds on R for different probabilities of human transmission, h.
VIETNAM INDONESIA
Average fraction of cases attributable to human contagion (h)
1.0 0.8 0.29 0.2 1.0 0.8 0.29 0.2
R min 0.26 0.23 0 0 0.16 0.09 0 0
ML R 0.53 0.46 0 0 0.56 0.43 0 0
Mean R 0.52 0.46 0.25 0 0.54 0.42 0 0
R max 0.77 0.68 0.42 0 0.89 0.75 0 0
Current estimates of R (i.e. highest probability R –M LR; and posterior mean R) for human H5N1 avian influenza, obtained from new case time series for Vietnam and
Indonesia. ‘‘R min’’ and ‘‘R max’’ denote the lower and upper bounds of the 95% credible intervals, respectively. h is the probability of human-to-human transmission
(see Methods). Analysis of reported cases from Thailand, China, and Turkey lead to similar or lower R estimates, but display wider bounds due to smaller case numbers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002185.t001
Real Time Bayesian Estimation
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 May 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 5 | e2185terms, relies on several general assumptions, which are simplistic in
specific situations. First, these models do not account for contact
heterogeneities, resulting from spatial effects, age, and/or the
structure of social networks. These effects can be partially
addressed by structuring the population compartments in terms
of spatial and risk classes [42]. For example, different regions in an
affected country may be taken as separate compartments,
provided that there are data pertaining to each region. Indeed
the method would thenallow estimation ofcorrelations between R at
differentspatiallocations.Second,initspresentform,themodeldoes
not include independent estimation of infectious or incubation
periods. It is straightforward to include an incubation period [43]
and, given data on the duration of these periods on a case by case
basis, these issues can be addressed by including additional Bayesian
estimation steps (see [32]). Notwithstanding these limiting features,
the SIR structure allows reliable real time parameter estimation with
quantified uncertainty at very low computational overhead, as
verified extensively via simulations at varying known input R,a n d
applications to past pandemic outbreaks (Supplementary Material
S1 – Fig. S5 and S6 – and Ref [34]).
One feature of the bounds on R derived here is their
dependency on the fraction of cases attributed to human
transmission, h. Although h is judged to be small from present
surveillance [23,27,28], it remains hard to quantify with certainty.
Given the paucity of data, we chose in practice to assume
independence and use a binomial probability to attribute cases to
human transmission vs. infection from the reservoir. However,
other procedures to determine h are possible. If enough data were
available, an explicit dynamical model of the (animal) reservoir
could be built, or an empirical function correlating introductions
through time could be used. Indeed, in the optimal scenario, the
actual cases of introduction from the reservoir would be known
from field work, and the method proposed here could incorporate
that information directly. We note that in the most relevant case,
when R becomes larger than 1, the effect of h,1 quickly vanishes,
as cases multiply exponentially. For R,1, even a choice of h=1
will lead to estimates of R,1, but different values of h may lead to
credible intervals that include the critical threshold. In general, we
believe that a suspicion of a possible R<1 should be followed up
with careful field investigations.
We presented a general methodology capable of interpreting
quantitatively emerging disease surveillance data in real time with
quantified uncertainty that complements other methods proposed
recently [21,29,30,32]. Although we illustrated the method with
Figure 3. Evolution of R estimates over time (weeks) for single realization simulated data with R0=0.8, 1.0, 1.4 and 1.7 (left to right,
top to bottom). Dashed lines indicate the value of R0 in the simulation. The decay of R estimates over time in standard epidemics is due to the
depletion of susceptibles. For R0=1.0, 1.4 and 1.7 the mean is indistinguishable from the estimate of R with maximum probability and is not shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002185.g003
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can be applied to time series from other communicable diseases.
We verified that the model developed here also applies to standard
epidemics, yielding agreement with previous estimates of R for the
1918 influenza pandemic in US cities [14,44] (Figures S5, S6 in
Supporting Information) and with other estimation methods [34].
We have also shown how to construct p-value statistical
significance tests suitable for automatically monitoring changes
in transmissibility of (emerging) communicable diseases [43].
While still in their infancy, we believe that the current emerging
trend in mathematical epidemiology towards real time predictive
methods will enable a shift towards more quantitative surveillance
and primary prevention, resulting in more consistent and extensive
monitoring of emerging infectious diseases and improved designs
for health interventions and logistic allocations as epidemics
unfold.
Supporting Information
Material S1 In Supplementary Material S1, we present further
details of the method, including extensions and additional
examples.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002185.s001 (0.28 MB
PDF)
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Figure 4. Sequential Bayesian estimation of the posterior mean
R (red dots) and 95% credible intervals (solid lines) for the time
series of H5N1 avian influenza in (a) Vietnam and (b)
Indonesia, under the pessimistic assumption that 29% of
reported cases are due to human-to-human transmission (see
Table 1); and (c) for seasonal H3N2 human influenza isolates in
the USA during the 2004–2005 season. (Note that isolates
represent only a small fraction of total cases, and may contain reporting
biases.) The estimate of the effective reproduction number for an
epidemic outbreak asymptotes to unity at late times because initial
growth and long-term decay in new case numbers (due to depletion of
susceptibles) average out over the history of the outbreak.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002185.g004
Figure 5. Prediction for new cases of avian influenza (simulated
data R0=0.8, with infections from reservoir taken from
Vietnam time series, Fig. 1a) vs. realized new cases (blue dots).
Between weeks 74 and 75, the reproduction number is shifted
R0=0.8R1.3 to create an epidemic. Although we continued to iterate
the R distributions via the Bayesian procedure described in the text,
note that the shift in R upwards leads to many statistical anomalies
(indicated by black arrows). The anomaly is detected immediately, on
weeks 75 and 76. Anomalies here are defined as observed numbers of
new cases that fall outside the expected 95% credible interval. These
anomalies indicate a violation of the hypothesis that R is unchanged,
and could be used to trigger alerts in surveillance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002185.g005
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